Empirical Evaluations

Adversarial benchmark & honest limitations.

SentinelLLM is evaluated using PromptProbe, an offline reproducible test harness. We measure probabilistic content detection alongside deterministic action enforcement.

Test Methodology
Dataset
starter_adversarial_v1.json
23 single cases · 10 multi-turn scenarios
Execution Mode
Offline Deterministic Baseline
Zero network dependency · $0.00 spend
Enforcement Invariant
0 Unauthorized Executions
100% action boundary containment
Layer 1: Content Inspection

Classification performance across 16 inbound content cases

Evaluates the ability of regex heuristics and classifiers to detect direct imperative prompt injections, persona hijacking, and instruction extraction.

TRUE POSITIVES
7
Injections Blocked
FALSE POSITIVES
0
Benign False Alarms
FALSE NEGATIVES
1
Base64 Evasion
TRUE NEGATIVES
8
Benign Permitted
Precision: 100.0%
Recall: 87.5%
F1 Score: 0.9333
Accuracy: 93.75%
Known Failure Analysis

False negative on test case INJ-DIR-002

Case INJ-DIR-002 encodes an imperative prompt injection payload inside Base64 encoding. The sub-5ms regex heuristic tier examines plain text tokens and does not trigger on raw base64 character blocks, passing it as a false negative.

This failure highlights why content inspection alone is never sufficient for securing agentic systems. In SentinelLLM, even if an encoded payload convinces an LLM to request an unauthorized tool invocation, the Egress Policy Enforcement Point blocks the action deterministically.

Layer 2: Action Enforcement

Deterministic tool gating results

Across 7 action test cases testing missing permissions, parameter boundary violations, and unapproved sensitive calls:

Total Action Evaluation Cases:7
Unauthorized Executions:0 (0.00%)
Correctly Permitted Safe Actions:2
Correctly Denied Actions:4
Held for Supervisor Approval:1